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In this paper we formulate a household production model to explain the 
allocation of time of women and men between paid labor, household work, 
care for children, care for the partner, and leisure time. Time allocation models 
provide a framework in which the value of household production can be 
estimated and the division of non-market time into different uses like child- 
rearing, housework, etc. can be analyzed. In this respect time allocation models 
are to be valued. The data for the empirical analyses are taken from the Dutch 
sample 'Women on Work’ 1991/1992 and the Dutch GPD survey 1991. 
Another question we will address concerns the effect of the 'quality' of 
children on the allocation of time. The concept of 'child quality’ -as devised 
by Becker (1960) - enters the household production model to account for those 
characteristics of children, apart from their number, which provide utility to 
their parents.
The value of household production and the value of child care provided 
is calculated by means of the 'opportunity costs approach'. The value of non 
market production is determined by the market wage rate. The calculated value 
says something about the value of alternative time use (time spent on non- 
market activities instead of market activities).
The empirical results show that the time allocation of the wife and the 
time allocation of her husband/partner are complements rather than substitutes; 
if she spends more time on an activity, he spends more time on this activity as 
well. And if he spends more time on it, she spends more on it as well. If the 
woman participates in the labor market, men do not take over much of the 
housework or care for children; he rather spends more time in the labor market 
as well. Children have a very large effect on the time allocation of women. 
Children hardly effect the time allocation of men. We found no results to 
confirm that the 'male chauvinist model'; husband/partner decides, woman 
adjusts, still holds. Other income in the household has an insignificant effect. 
In determing their own labor supply females do not take theirs husband 
earnings into consideration. They do respond to changes in their own wage 
rates, to the presence and age of children and to the existence of marital 
conflicts. The estimates of the demand for 'child quality' equations show that 
older women have fewer problems with their children. It is remarkable, 
however, that 80% of the women report having a child with sleeping problems. 
Women who are in the labor market have more obedient children. Years of 
education increase problems with children demanding attention and sleeping 























































































































































































The time allocation model developed in this paper can be seen as an extension 
of the Heckman (1974) labor supply model, and as a structural approach (with 
more activities ditinguished) to the household production model proposed by 
Gronau (1980). We formulate a household production model including four 
activities: market work, housework, child care and leisure.
The actual time use need not be ideal. It may be possible to prefer a 
time schedule different from the actual allocation of time. An individual might 
not be able to find a job consistent with actual preferences as regards number 
of working hours. This is the case with involuntary unemployment (where the 
actual number of working hours is zero) or with full-time employment if it is 
impossible for organizational reasons for the individual to work part-time. 
Equally, the actual allocation of time to housework or the care of children 
might not match individual preferences (for example, where the wife would 
prefer her husband to make a greater contribution to family care). Finally, 
there could be discrepancies between the time actually spent caring for children 
and the time the individual would like to spend on this activity. Paid 
employment reduces the time actually spent on child care. If no suitable non- 
parental child care is available, or if paternal child care would be preferred, 
actual and preferred time use need not necessarily correspond.
The time allocation model is both estimated on the basis of the actual 
distribution of hours between the activities distinguished and the preferred 
allocation of time. From both estimates we can calculate the value of household 
and market production. By comparing the value of production based on the 
actual allocation of time with the value of production based on the preferred 
allocation of time, it is possible to estimate the welfare gains from a more 
satisfactory (or optimal) allocation of time.
An important issue in household production models is returns to scale. 
Returns to scale in household production may explain the division of paid and 
unpaid labor between women and men (see Blau & Ferber 1992 for 
illustrations). Two types of economies of scale in household production can be 
distinguished. The first are returns to scale in household size. If there are 
positive returns to household scale, the value of household production is an 
increasing function of household size. Secondly, there may be returns to scale 
in the time spend on household activities. With constant returns to scale, each 
hour of household production yields the same value. With increasing 



























































































(decreases) with the time spent on household activities. If there are increasing 
(decreasing) returns to scale, the average costs of household production 
decrease (increase) with the time spent on household activities. If the household 
production function exhibits first increasing and later on decreasing returns to 
scale, the average costs curve will be U-shaped. In that case, cost 
minimalization behavior means that the optimal scale of household production 
is at the point at which there are constant returns to scale.
Another question we will address in this paper concerns the effect of the 
quality of children on the allocation of time. The concept of 'child quality' - as 
devised by Becker (1960) - enters the household production model to account 
for those characteristics of children, apart from their number, which provide 
utility to their parents. Willis (1971, 1973) presents a household production 
model in which household utility is determined by the number and quality of 
children. From this model it is possible to derive the demand for children 
equation and the demand for child quality equation. Due to lack of data, only 
the former equation is estimated in most of the empirical applications of this 
household production model. In this chapter we estimate demand equations for 
child quality. The child quality variables are also included in the time 
allocation model and used to explain time spent by the mother on caring for 
her children.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 offers a brief description of 
the data used in the empirical analysis of labor supply and time allocation. 
Section 3 contains some descriptive statistics on the actual and preferred time 
allocations of women and men. Section 4 gives a brief survey of the literature 
on empirical models of time allocation based on household production models. 
Section 5 presents the estimation results for the demand for child quality 
equations and Section 6 the household production model of paid labor, 
household labor, and maternal child care. Details of the econometric analysis 
can be found in Appendix A. Section 7 contains the estimation results of the 
time allocation model. Section 8 briefly summarizes the results of a replication 
of the time allocation model on another data-set. Section 9 presents some 
estimations of the value of household production and some simulations on the 





























































































2 T he data used from  the 'W om en on w ork '1 stra tified  
sam ple.
The data for the estimations are taken from the stratified sample 'Women on 
Work'. This sample contains information on time allocation, wages and 
individual characteristics from a written and a telephone survey. The data-set 
has the further advantage that it contains information on the quality of 
children. It also provides information on the women's actual and preferred time 
allocations.
For the estimation of the household production model we used information 
from the written survey only. From the stratified sample we selected women 
who had a job, were married/cohabiting and had children.
Measurement problems are an important factor in time use studies 
(Juster & Stafford 1991). Essentially, there are two methods of collecting time 
budget data: the time diary method and the recall method. Time diary data are 
usually considered to be more accurate (Juster & Stafford 1991; Gronau 1986, 
p.279; Flood & Klevmarken, 1992), but are more expensive to collect. In our 
data, time use was measured by asking the women to allocate actual and 
preferred hours per week for herself and her partner to the following activities: 
market work, voluntary work, household work, caring for children, personal 
care and leisure. For the analyses we used three categories of time use: market 
work, household work and caring for children. To comply with the adding-up 
constraint in econometrics, we omitted one category; leisure.
We also used information on characteristics of the child(ren) present in 
the household (boisterious, obedient, demands attention, sleeping problems, 
illness).
3 T im e use patterns o f w om en and men
Despite the fact, that - on average - more than 80 percent of women's time is 
devoted to non-market activities, little is known about how women allocate this 
time not devoted to paid labor. A cross-country comparison of time allocation 
in Juster & Stafford (1991) shows that on average women spend between 24 
and 35 hours per week on market work, between 27 and 34 hours on
1 Maassen van den Brink, H (1994), Female labor supply, child care and marital conflict, 




























































































housework, about 70 hours on personal care (including sleeping), and between 
25 and 42 hours on leisure. Women in paid employment spend less time on 
housework and child care than women who are not employed.
The amount of time women spend on market work has increased over 
recent decades. At the same time, the amount of time spent on housework and 
child care has decreased. The time men spend on housework is roughly the 
same in all countries, the only exceptions being Norway, Sweden and Japan. 
Norwegian and Swedish men spend relatively more time doing housework, 
whereas Japanese men do not spend any time at all on caring for their children 
or doing housework. The international differences in housework time are much 
smaller for women than for men (Juster & Stafford 1991; SCP 1992).
On the basis of these international time use studies, we could conclude 
that the fact that the time men spend on housework and caring for children 
seems to be independent of female participation means essentially (in terms of 
overall time use) that the 'male chauvinist model1 dominates: male time 
expenditure is fixed while females 'choose1 between care, market work, market 
care, etc.. However, as the results in this paper will show, this conclusion 
would be somewhat premature. The relations between male and female labor 
supplies are more complicated. We will return to this issue later.
This section compares the actual and preferred time use of women and men in 
different household types. Five different household types are distinguished by 
labor force or non-labor force participation of the wife:
1. Dual-earner couples with no children (have paid employment/no 
children);
2. Families with children and where the wife has no paid employment, the 
husband/partner has paid employment, and there is no use of non- 
parental child care (no paid employment/children/no child care);
3. Families with children in which both spouses have paid employment and 
do not use non-parental child care (paid employment/children/no child 
care);
4. Families with children where the wife has no paid employment, the 
husband/partner has paid employment and there is use of non-parental 
child care (no paid employment/children/use of child care);
5. Families with children where both spouses have paid employment and 




























































































Time use is divided into three categories: paid employment, housework and 
caring for children. Leisure and voluntary work are not considered. For each of 
the categories, actual and preferred time use is given.
Table 1 shows the average actual and preferred time use for market work, 
housework and child care for women in five types of households.
Table 1







actual preferred actual preferred actual preferred
market work, 
no children


















19.5 21.3 29.7 25.5 28.0 29.0
In general, all women with children would prefer to have more market work 
and less housework. Women in full-time employment would like to reduce 
their working hours and would prefer to spend one more hour on housework. 
Women participating in the labor market would prefer to spend more time with 
their children and women not in the labor force would prefer to spend less time 
on child care, probably because they would prefer a job for about 10 hours per 
week. Gaps between actual and preferred time spent on non-market work, i.e. 
housework and child care, are large. On average, most gaps between actual 
and preferred time use on market work are small. However, the most striking 
result concerns the gap between actual and preferred allocation of market time 
for non-participating women, they would prefer a small part-time job (11 to 12 




























































































Table 2 presents the actual and preferred time use of men, as reported in the 
questionnaire by their female partners. In fact these results represent her
preferences on his time allocation.
Table 2

































46.0 40.8 11.5 15.9 12.8 21.2
On average, men spend 10 to 16 hours per week on housework. Dual-earner 
families with no children present are those where the husband/partner spends 
most time doing housework. Families where women do not participate in the 
labor market are those where the husband/partner spends the least time on 
doing housework. Where women do have paid employment the 
husband/partner spends slightly more time on housework, but on average the 
differences are negligible between families where the woman has paid 
employment and those where she does not. Where the woman has paid 
employment, the husband/partner spends on average an extra one-and-a-half to 



























































































Despite the fact that men spend so little time on housework, they do not 
spend much time with their children either. On average, they spend between 9 
and 13 hours per week caring for their children. In families using non-parental 
child care, men spend somewhat more time with their children as compared to 
men in families who do not use non-parental child care. There are some, but 
only very minor, differences between traditional families and dual-earner 
families.
Women would like their husbands/partners to spend substantially more 
time with their children. On average, women would prefer paternal child care 
for 15 to 21 hours per week. This means an increase of five to ten hours per 
week. Labor force participants in particular would like their husbands to 
provide more family/child care. Women in paid employment and using non- 
parental child care would like their husbands/partners to spend more than twice 
as much time caring for the children as they actually do.
In general, we could speak of an 'equality' in the time use of the partners 
in dual-earner couples without children (at least, if we define equality' in this 
context as meaning an equal division in the time spent on paid and unpaid labor 
by women and men). The ’inequality’ between the two sexes' time use seems to 
be caused by the presence of children in the household.
It is obvious that women are rationed in their optimal allocation of time 
and that hours are institutionally fixed. The same is true of the way men 
allocate their non-market time, at least if we accept wives'preferences on his 
allocation of time. For the preferred allocation we may assume that hours of 
work can be varied freely. To see if there are any differences we present 
estimates based on the actual distribution of time as well.2
4 Survey o f  literature on household production m odels
In the empirical literature on the allocation of time within a household 
production framework two approaches can be distinguished. The first approach 
specifies a specific functional form for the household production function for 
the derivation of allocation equations. Examples of this approach are Graham 
& Green (1984) and Kooreman & Kapteyn (1987). Graham & Green (1984)
2 The criticism to the use of individual and household preferences in empirical research is 
mistaken. Individual and household preferences and behavior, indeed, depend on the relation 
between family members, social and cultural norms with respect to gender roles in society 
(which will vary over time). But, subjects are often, for instance, asked to respond to 
(hypothetical) questions such as: Would you still use your car if the level of road tax doubled? 



























































































use a Cobb-Douglas specification for the household production function, while 
Kooreman & Kapteyn (1987) use the indirect translog utility function as a 
specification for their model. A disadvantage of this approach could be that 
results may be sensitive to the specific functional form chosen (see Gronau 
1986, p. 285).
The second approach is to specify specific functional forms for the 
equilibrium conditions of the household production model. This approach is 
taken in Gronau (1980). In his model in equilibrium, there is an equality for 
persons with paid work between the marginal productivity of work at home, 
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and income (the reservation 
wage), and the market wage rate. Gronau then specifies a functional form for 
the home production function, from which the equation for work at home is 
derived.
The empirical results presented in Gronau (1980) suggest that in the U.S. 
the value of household production is approximately 70% of household income 
after tax. For households with young children, the value of household 
production is about equal to family income after tax. For women with young 
children, the loss of household production when the woman enters the labor 
market almost equals the net earnings from paid work. Gronau (1980) also 
finds that the value of household production increases with education, but the 
increase in the value of household production with education is less than the 
increase in the market wage with education.
Graham & Green (1984) conclude from their empirical findings that the 
elasticity of household production with respect to market goods is larger than 
the elasticity with respect to the time spent on household production. They also 
conclude that there are no economies of scale in household production, and that 
for both men and women human capital is more productive in market work 
than in housework.
Kooreman & Kapteyn (1987) find that the presence and age of children 
have a large effect on the time women spend on the care of children. The 
presence of children reduces the time spent on entertainment and social 
activities. However, the allocation of time by the husband is hardly affected by 
the presence of children.
Some empirical studies of the allocation of time within a household 
production framework suffer from one or more of three potential drawbacks: 
1) restrictive functional forms, 2) a limited number of time use categories, or 
3) no correction for selection bias.
Only a few studies distinguish more than two categories of time use. 
Most only distinguish between time spent on housework and pure' leisure. An 
exception is Kooreman & Kapteyn (1987) which distinguishes seven types of 



























































































services, 4) personal needs and care (including sleeping), 5) organizational 
activities, hobbies and sports, 6) entertainment and social activities, and 7) 
radio, television, reading books etc. Gronau (1980) and Graham & Green 
(1984) estimate the coefficients of one activity equation: female housework.
Estimation of allocation of time models on the basis only of individuals 
in paid employment introduces a selection bias. Gronau (1980) and Graham & 
Green (1984) ignore selection bias, while Kooreman & Kapteyn (1987) use a 
two-step estimation method to correct for it.
In the household production model estimated in Section 6, we correct for 
selection bias (cf. Appendix A) due to non-participation in paid employment. 
We use three categories of time use: market work, housework and child care. 
Finally, we avoid the problems of restrictiveness of functional forms of the 
household production function by using the equilibrium conditions as a 
starting-point for the empirical implementation of the model.
5 E xplaining child characteristics
In this section, we attempt to identify the determinants of child characteristics. 
Child characteristics can be seen as an aspect of 'child quality1. Willis 
(1971,1973) presents a household production model in which one factor 
determining the utility of the household is the total quantity of child services. 
The quantity of child services is defined as the product of the number of 
children and the quality per child. The quality of the child is defined as the 
child services produced within the household from which the household derives 
utility. The quality per child is generated within the household by a production 
function with market goods and time as inputs. The household chooses the 
number of children, the amount of quality of the children, and the amount of 
other commodities in order to maximize their life-time utility function, subject 
to a budget and a time restriction. Using this assumption of optimizing 
behavior, it is possible to derive the demand function for the number of 
children as a function of the woman's labor supply, total married life-time, 
total life-time income and the amount of initial human capital. In a similar 
manner, it is possible to derive the demand equations for the quality of 
children.
In empirical applications of Willis' household production model, the 
quality of children is usually neglected due to lack of relevant data. Our data 
contains unique information on the following six child characteristics: the 
boisterousness of the child(ren), whether they are obedient or not, whether they 



























































































they have any other peculiarities because of which they need more attention. 
From this information we constructed the following variables: a dummy 
variable if any of the children is boisterous, a dummy if any of the children is 
disobedient, a dummy if any of the children demands a lot of attention, a 
dummy if any of the children sleeps poorly, a dummy if any of the children is 
frequently ill, and a dummy if any of the children has any other peculiarities.
As explanatory variables we use the human capital, time input, labor 
market status and income variables suggested by the theory of the New Home 
Economics. More specifically, we estimate probit equations for the six child 
characteristics separately using the following explanatory variables: years of 
education of the woman, her age, a dummy indicating whether she participates 
in the labor market, the number of hours spent on child care by the woman, 
and the sum of the earnings of the husband and the non-labor income of the 
household.
Table 3




































































































-238.908 -105.904 -232.864 -133.583 -123.261 -255.195




0.44 0.09 0.54 0.80 0.10 0.29



























































































Sleeping problems are the most frequently reported: 80% of the women 
indicate that they have at least one child with sleeping problems. More than 
half the women (54%) have children who demand a lot of attention, while 44% 
have children who are boisterous. Comparatively few women report having 
children who are frequently ill (10%) or disobedient (9%).
Age of the woman is the only variable that is significantly different from 
zero in all but one of the probit equations. The only exception is the child 
illness equation, where none of the variables has a significant effect. Whether 
or not children are frequently ill is not determined by characteristics of the 
mother, but probably by other - more physical - characteristics of the children 
themselves.
The coefficient of the age variable is negative in all equations, indicating 
that older women have fewer problems with their children. Years of education 
increase problems with children demanding attention problems and sleeping 
poorly. Participation in the labor market has an effect only on the obedience of 
the child. The sign of the effect indicates that women who participate in the 
labor market have more obedient children.
Hours spent on child care have no effect on child quality (except for 
sleeping problems), nor has income.
The result concerning age of the woman, can be seen as a confirmation 
of Willis' theory of household production: older women possess more human 
capital, have better quality children and experience fewer problems with them. 
In this sense the household production explanation that there is a causality from 
mother's characteristics to child quality can be confirmed. However, a more 
direct explanation for the negative age effects could be that older women are 
more experienced in raising children and/or are more patient. The fact that the 
self-reported quality of the child by the mother varies systematically with 
characteristics of the mother indicates that child quality is not exogenous. The 
results obtained for the child illness equation, where none of the variables has a 
significant effect, confirms this notion. The reported characteristics of the child 
are probably a mixture of the perceptions of the mother and the true' 
characteristics of the child.
In the next section, the child quality variables are included in the time 
allocation model and used to explain time spent by the mother on caring for 
her children.
From the probit estimates we can conclude that there is no simultaneous 




























































































6 H ousehold production and tim e allocation
The model developed in this section assumes that women can derive utility 
from three goods: leisure, child care services and other commodities. 
Commodities are 'produced' by women by combining market goods and time 
inputs. Child care services are measusred in time input by the mother, hence 
these services are valued through the mother's time only. The woman 
maximizes her utility subject to two restrictions: a time restriction and a budget 
restriction. Utility maximization yields the equilibrium conditions. These 
conditions state that in equilibrium the marginal value of housework and the 
marginal rate of substitution between child care time and consumption by the 
mother equal the market wage rate. Moreover, in equilibrium the reservation 
wage equals the market wage rate. Following Heckman (1974) and Gronau 
(1980), we specify functional forms for the market wage rate, the reservation 
wage, the marginal value of housework and the marginal rate of substitution 
between child care and consumption. From these equations we derive the 
equations for the time allocation on paid work, housework and child care by 
the mother. In the econometric specifications we show how these three time 
allocation equations can be estimated jointly and how we account for possible 
selection bias due to non-participation in the labor market.
6.1 The household production m odel3
Assume that a woman's preferences for consumption, child care services and leisure can be 
described by a utility function U:
U = U(Z, Hc, L) (1)
where Z represents the consumption of commodities in the household by the woman, L is the 
amount of her leisure consumed and Hc is the time spent on child care by the mother.
Commodities within the household are produced by combining market goods (X) and time 
inputs (Hz). We assume that household production technology can be represented by a 
production function, where input factors X and Hz are used to produce Z:
Z = Z(X. Hz) (2)
We assume the following functional form for Z:




























































































Z = X + Z(Hz) (2a)
Commodities Z consist of goods bought at the market plus goods produced by the time inputs 
of the woman in housework.
The woman is confronted with two restrictions on her behavior: a budget restriction and a time 
restriction. The budget restriction is given by:
X = WN + p (3)
where p is non-labor income (including earnings of the spouse), W is the real wage rate and 
and N is the number of hours of paid labor. The price of market goods is normalized to one. 
The time restriction is:
L + N + Hc + Hz = T (4)
where T is the total time endowment.
If we substitute the time constraint (4) into the budget constraint (3), and re-arrange we get:
X = W(T - L - Hc - Hz) + |l (5)
or
X + WL + WHC + WHZ = WT + p (6)
where WT + p is full-income, i.e. the virtual income available for allocation between income, 
household work, child care and leisure.
The woman allocates her full-income over commodities, leisure, child care and housework in 
order to maximize her utility or welfare level, i.e. she maximizes the utility function (equation 
1) under the budget and time restrictions (equation 6). The Lagrange equation for this 
optimization problem is:
L = U(Z(X, Hz), Hc, L) + X(Y - X - WL - WHC - WHZ) (7)
where Y is full-income.
Maximization of the utility function yields the first order or equilibrium conditions o f the
model:
0U /3Z)0Z/3X) = X (8)
0U /9Z)0Z/9H z) = XW (9)
(3U/3HC) = XW  (10)




























































































Combining (8) and (11) yields:
(3u/aL)/[(au/az)(3z/ax)] =w < 12)
From equation (2a) we see that 3Z/3X = 1, hence equation (12) can be rewritten as: 
(3U/3L)/(au/3Z) = W (12a)
(dU/3L)/(3U/aZ) is the marginal rate of substitution between leisure L and commodities Z.
Combining (8) and (9) yields:
[OU/3Z)(3Z/aHz)]/[(3U/3Z)(3Z/aX)] = W (13)
or
(3Z/3Hz) = W (13a)
where (3Z/3Hz) is the marginal value of household work.
Finally, combining (8) and (10) yields:
(au/3Hc)/[(3U/dZ)(az/3X)] = W (14)
or
(3U/3Hc)/(dU/aZ) = W (14a)
where (3U/3HC)/(3U/3Z) is the marginal rate o f substitution between child care time and 
commodities.
For the empirical implementation of the model we can specify either functional forms for the 
household production functions (2) and utility function (1) or specify functional forms for the 
marginal rates of substitution expressions in equation (12a), (13a) and (14a). In this chapter we 
take the latter approach (see Gronau, 1980).
Let MVZ = OZ/3Hz) be the marginal value of housework; MRSC = (3U/3Hc)/(au/3Z) is the 
marginal rate o f substitution between child care time and commodities. Further, let MRSr = 
OU/aLVOU/aZ) be the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and commodities or the 
reservation wage.
For the wage equation we follow the standard Mincerian semi-logaritmic specification:
Log W = YWPW + £w (15)
where the log of the net wage rate W is a function of human capital variables Yw with 




























































































For the reservation wage, we specify the following equation:
Log MRSr = Yr[3r + a,.N + er (16)
where Yr is a vector o f individual characteristics with coefficient pr. The level of the 
reservation wage further depends on the number of hours of paid labor N with coefficient a r  
This specification of the reservation wage corresponds to the Heckman (1974) approach to 
modelling labor supply. The inverse of the coefficent otj. measures the wage effect on hours of 
paid labor.
For the marginal value of housework, we specify the following equation:
Log MVZ = YZPZ + a zHz + ez (17)
We assume that the marginal value of household time depends on individual characteristics 
(Yz) and the time spent on housework (Hz). The inverse of a z measures the productivity 
effect on the time spent on housework.
For the marginal rate o f substitution between child care time and commodities, we specify:
Log MRSC = YCPC + a cHc + £c (18)
The log of the marginal rate of substitution between time spent on child care by the mother and 
commodities is a linear function of characteristics of the child (Yc) and the time spent on child 
care (Hc).
Using the equilibrium condition (12a, 13a, and 14a), we can derive the time allocation 
equations for women who participate in the labor market. The equation for the supply of paid 
labor hours is found by equating equations (15) and (16):
Log MRSr = Log W
Yrpr + a rN + er = Ywpw + ew (19)
and solve for N - the number of hours of paid labor. This yields the supply of paid labor hours 
equation for the individual:
N = (Ywpw -Y rPr + ew - e r)/ar (20)
To derive the equation for the time spent on housework, we use the equality between the log of 
the marginal value of housework (log MVZ) and the log of the market wage rate (log W) in 
equilibrium (equations 15 and 17). From this, we derive that:




























































































In the same way, we derive the equation for the optimum hours o f child care for the woman 
from the equality between log MRSC and log W:
Hc = (YwPw ' YcPc + ew ' ec)/ctc (22)
6.2 D escriptive statistics
Table 4 contains the average sample values of the actual and preferred 
allocation of time of employed women (in hours per week). The average 
period of paid employment of the women participating is 19 hours per week. 
Employed married women with children spend an average of 32 hours per 
week on household activities and 23 hours on child care. If we compare the 
average preferred allocation of time with the average actual allocation, we note 
that women would prefer to increase their labor supply and hours spent on 
child care, while reducing their hours of housework (cf. table 1).
Table 4
Actual and preferred time allocation of employed women with children (average sample 
values of hours per week, standard errors in brackets)_____________________________
actual allocation of time preferred allocation of 
time




child care by the mother 22.94 25.74
(11.92) (15.62)
#observations 187 150
In the wage equation we use human capital variables as years of education, 
years of actual labor market experience, experience squared. De vector Yw 
includes: years of education, years of work experience, experience squared and 
a dummy for whether the woman has had an interruption period from the labor 
market.
In the reservation wage equation, we include the variables: income of 
partner and non-labor income, number of children aged 0-3 years, number of 
children aged 4-12 years, number of children aged 13-18 years, number of 
children over the age of 18 and hours in the market. By including the labor 
earnings of the husband in the reservation wage equation, we implicitly assume 



























































































woman is the secondary worker in the household: the male partner determines 
his hours of paid work irrespective of his wife's allocation of time and the wife 
adjusts her hours of paid labor to suit her husband's decision. The same holds 
for time spent on child care and time spent on housework.
The equation for the marginal value of housework includes other 
household income, number of children aged 0-3 years, number of children 
aged 4-12 years, number of children aged 13-18 years, and number of children 
over the age of 18.
The equation for the marginal rate of substitution between child care and 
commodities includes the following variables: other household income, number 
of children aged 0-3 years, number of children aged 4-12 years, number of 
children aged 13-18 years, and number of children over the age of 18. We also 
include variables for the quality of the child as used in Section 5: a dummy 
variable if any of the children is boisterous, a dummy if any of the children is 
disobedient, a dummy if any of the children demands a lot of attention, a 
dummy if any of the children has a sleeping problem, a dummy if any of the 
children is frequently ill, and a dummy if any of the children has any other 
peculiarities because of which it needs more attention.
Table 5
Parameter estimates of the time allocation model (t-values in brackets)
















other income in household/1000 0.150 0.002
(0.795) (0.090)




























































































number of children aged 4-12 years 0.221 0.174
(1.494) (0.778)
number o f children aged 13-18 years 0.056 0.002
(0.385) (0.085)
number o f children over 18 years -0.044
(0.203)
@
market time (a,.) 0.046*** 0.078*
(3.078) (1.936)
Marginal value of housework
other income in household/1000 0.032 0.189
(0.099) (0.351)
number of children aged 0-3 years -0.042 -0.278
(0.159) (0.625)
number of children aged 4-12 years -0.443 -0.291
(1.531) (0.821)
number of children aged 13-18 years -0.293 -0.589
(0.983) (1.304)
number of children over 18 years -0.657
(1.352)
@
time spent on housework (az) 0.095*** 0.104***
(6.320) (4.061)
Marginal rate of substitution 
between child care and commodities
other income in household/1000 -0.185 0.015
(0.646) (0.027)
number of children aged 0-3 years -1.488*** -1.298**
(3.889) (1.986)
number of children aged 4-12 years -0.553** 0.321
(2.057) (0.798)
number of children aged 13-18 years 0.800*** 0.651
(3.726) (1.562)
number of children aged over 18 years 0.643
(0.966)
@
child boisterous 0.212 -0.053
(0.949) (0.168)
child disobedient -0.382 -0.585
(1.334) (0.775)
child demands attention -0.060 0.633*
(0.239) (1.697)
child has problems sleeping 0.466 -0.740
(1-535) (1.037)

































































































































# o b se rv a tio n s 178 147
log likelihood -1214.06 -1080.25
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
due to lack of observations, 'number of children over 18 years' was aggregated with ‘number
of children aged 13-18 years'.
7 E stim ation results o f the tim e allocation m odel
The parameter estimates are given in table 5. The rate of return to education is 
approximately 3%. The effect of education on market wages is similar in terms 
both of the actual allocation of time and the preferred allocation. Experience 
has an inverse U-shaped effect on market wages, as expected. The experience- 
wage profile in the actual allocation of time model is a little steeper than in the 
preferred allocation of time model. In the actual hours model, the dummy 
variable for a period away from the labor market is positive, indicating that 
those who have been unemployed or out of the labor force for a while have 
higher wages than those who have not. In the preferred hours model, the 
interruption dummy is not significant.
Other income in the household has an insignificant effect in all three 
equations. This suggests that the time allocation of the mother is independent 
of the earnings of the husband and other non-labor income. This finding does 



























































































Children have a significant effect on the marginal rate of substitution 
between child care by the mother and commodities but not on her reservation 
wage or on the marginal value of housework. Young children - aged between 0 
and 3 and between 4 and 5 years -decrease the marginal rate of substitution of 
child care and increase the time spent on child care by the mother. The 
presence of older children decreases the time spent on child care by the mother. 
An explanation for these negative effects of older children may be that older 
children take over some of the care for younger children from the mother.In 
the actual hours model, a child aged between 0 and 3 decreases the marginal 
rate of substitution of child care by almost 150%, while a child aged between 4 
and 5 decreases the marginal rate of substitution of child care by 55%. A child 
aged between 6 and 12 years increases the marginal rate of substitution of child 
care by 80%.
The estimation results do not show that there are economies of scale 
associated with household size. Children have no effect on time spent on 
housework, but young children do have a major effect on time spent on child 
care. The time spent on child care by women with young children is at the 
expense of their leisure time, not at the expense of labor supply.
The demographic effects in the preferred hours model are less than in the 
actual hours model. Perhaps women more or less ignore the presence of 
children in determining their preferred allocation of time.
The characteristics of.the children all have an insignificant effect on the 
time spent on children.
In the actual hours model, an hour of paid work raises the reservation wage by 
4.6%, while in the preferred hours model the figure is 7.8%. The inverse of 
the hours of work coefficient measures the wage effect on hours of paid labor. 
A 1% increase in the hourly wage rate implies that the actual hours of paid 
employment per week increase by a little less than a quarter of an hour, while 
the preferred hours of work increase by approximately 8 minutes. Calculated in 
the mean value of the actual hours of work variable (19 hours per week) the 
wage elasticity of actual labor supply is 1.14. In the preferred hours of work 
model, the wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.61. Separating household and 
child care activities from leisure time does not change the wage elasticity of 
labor supply.
An hour of housework increases the marginal value of housework by 
9.5% in the actual hours model, and by 10.4% in the preferred hours model. In 
the average value of actual hours spent on housework (32 hours per week), the 
elasticity of housework with respect to the marginal value of housework is
0.329. A 1% increase in the marginal value of housework increases the time 



























































































value elasticity of housework is 0.343 (calculated in the mean value of the 
preferred hours of housework).
An hour of child care increases the marginal rate of substitution between 
child care and commodities by approximately 11 %. In the average hours of 
child care (23 hours per week in the actual hours allocation and 26 hours in the 
preferred hours distribution), the marginal rate of substitution elasticity of 
child care time is 0.378 in the actual hours model and 0.356 in the preferred 
hours model. A 1% increase in the marginal rate of substitution between child 
care and commodities increases the time devoted to child care by 
approximately 3.7%.
The variance of the marginal value of housework and the variance of the 
marginal rate of substitution between child care and commodities are 
substantially higher than the variance of the market wage equation. This 
suggests that women differ more in the value they attach to housework and 
child care services than in the value o f market work. The variance of the 
reservation wage equation is almost equal to that of the market wage equation.
The correlation coefficients between the market wage equation and the 
reservation wage equation and between the market wage equation and the 
marginal rate of substitution between child care and commodities equation are 
both positive but insignificant. The correlation coefficient between the market 
wage equation and the marginal value of housework equation is significantly 
negative: a higher market wage is associated with a lower marginal value of 
housework.
8 R eplication  on other data-sets
A similar time allocation model has been estimated on another data-set 
(see Groot & Maassen van den Brink in OSA 1994 for a detailed description of 
these results). There are a few notable differences between these data and those 
used in the previous section of this paper:
1) in the former data (OSA, 1994), four activities are distinguished instead of
three: paid employment,housework, child care and care of the spouse;
2) in the replication studies, we used information on both employed and non-
employed individuals;
3) in the replication studies, we used information not only on women but also
on men;




























































































5) the replication data do not contain information on the quality of children;
6) the replication estimates are on women aged between 24 and 46, married or
cohabiting with a male partner, and with children (and on their partners);
7) the number of observations in the empirical analysis of the replication data
is much larger (1,488 women and 1,094 men).
The allocation of time model in the replication study is estimated for women 
and men separately. For both sexes, two sets of equations are estimated: one 
including the time spent by the spouse on the activities distinguished, and a 
specification without the spouse's allocation of time as an explanatory variable. 
Including the spouse's allocation of time has little or no impact on the effects 
of other variables.
Most findings from the replication confirm the conclusions drawn in the 
previous section. Most of the coefficients of the time spent by the woman on 
the activities distinguished (the a's) are a little lower, but have the same signs 
as those presented in this paper.
In general we find that for women the a 's for care of the spouse, 
housework and child care are significantly less than one. The calculated wage 
elasticity of married women's labor supply is therefore also a little higher in the 
replication (1.2 in the mean value of the hours of work variable vs. 1.1 in the 
previous section of this paper).
The replication finds strong effects of the presence of young children on 
the reservation wage, but not on the time spent on housework and child care. 
Non-labor income and earnings of the partner have an insignificant effect on 
the allocation of time.
If we compare the results for women with those for men, we can draw the 
following conclusions:
1. The labor supply behavior of women is independent of male labor 
supply. Male labor supply, on the other hand, increases with the hours of 
paid work performed by the women.
2. The presence and age of the children has a major effect on the women's 
allocation of time, but no effect on male time allocation. Similar 
findings are reported by Kooreman & Kapteyn (1987).
3. The wage elasticity of female labor supply is greater than the own wage 
elasticity of male labor supply. However, the elasticity of the male value 
of household time and child care are much greater than those of the 
women. This implies that the allocation of male time to housework and 
child care is much more sensitive to the value of the individual's 



























































































allocation, while female labor supply is more sensitive to the value of 
market time (wage rate) than is the case with male labor supply.
For both partners, the time spent on care o f  the partner increases with the 
time spent on care by the partner: if she spends more time on him, he 
spends more time on her. The same holds for household time and child 
care: time spent by the female on these activities increases the time spent 
by the male on them. Non-market time of the partners in the household 
are complements. For the male partner, market time of both partners are 




























































































9 The value o f m arket and non-m arket production
The value of household production and the value of child care provided by the 
mother is calculated by means of the 'opportunity costs approach'. The value of 
non-market production is determined by the market wage rate. The calculated 
value says something about the value of alternative time use (time spent on 
non-market activities instead of market activities). The calculated values of 
total production do not express judgements about quality of household care and 
child care (cf. Appendix B).
Table 6
Mean values of market and non-market production for employed women with children 


















actual allocation of 
hours
labor earnings 248 213 233 281
value of market work 219 207 214 231
value of household 
production
245 237 245 267
value of child care 170 194 166 144
total value of production 633 639 624 642
#observations 178 67 108 60
preferred allocation of 
time
labor earnings 277 240 271 214
value of market work 180 176 173 193
value of household 
production
452 434 507 483
value of child care 996 2161 238 147
total value of production 1628 2770 918 823
#observations 143 57 86 49
The estimations of the value of (household) production are given in table 6. 
The value of production is calculated for each women in our sample 




























































































Table 6 shows that the value of non-market production (household 
production and child care) is substantial and exceeds that of market production. 
We also find that using the preferred hours model substantially increases the 
value of production. The expected labor earnings for all women with children 
below 18 are 248 guilders in the actual hour equation and 277 guilders in the 
preferred hours equation. For all women with children below the age of 18, the 
total value of production is 633 guilders per week using the actual allocation of 
time, and 1,628 guilders per week based on the preferred hours distribution. 
Therefore, reducing the (institutional) constraints on the allocation of time has 
a substantial welfare effect (although it is somewhat remarkable that in general 
women prefer to extend their - and their husbands' - total working hours of 
market and non-market work at the expense of leisure time).
The value of market work based on the actual hours distribution is 
higher than that based on the preferred hours distribution. This may indicate 
that women would like to reduce their hours of market work. Both the value of 
household production and the value of child care are higher using the preferred 
allocation than if based on the actual allocation. In particular, the value of child 
care increases if we use preferred hours.
The value of market work increases with the age of the children. In the 
actual hours calculations, the value of market work is 207 guilders per week 
for women with children aged 0-3 years and 231 guilders for women with 
children aged 13-18. This is probably an effect of experience: women with 
older children (potentially) possess more human capital due to their greater 
(potential) labor market experience. This increases the value of their market 
work.
The value of child care decreases with the age of children. In the actual 
hours distribution, the value of child care is 194 guilders for women with 
children aged 0-3 years and 144 guilders for women with children aged 13-18. 
This reflects the reduction in time spent on child care as the children get older.
In order to gain greater insight into the results, we have calculated the expected 
value of market and non-market production for three types of women: a 'full- 
time homemaker1, a woman who has part-time market work, and a woman who 
has full-time market work. Each of these three types of women is assumed to 
allocate 70 hours per week to a combination of market work, housework and 
child care. A woman - oriented towards non-market work - is defined as a 
woman who does not perform market work, who works 40 hours a week in the 
household and spends 30 hours a week on child care. A part time working 
woman works 20 hours a week in the labor market, spends 30 hours on 
housework and 20 hours on caring for her children. These values roughly 



























































































market work - works 40 hours a week on the labor market, spends 10 hours on 
housework and 20 hours a week on child care. For each of these three women 
we have calculated the value of market and non-market work setting the 
exogenous variables at their respective average values.
Table 7










actual allocation of time
labor earnings 0 259 517
value of market time 0 179 630
value of household 
production
309 115 11
value of child care by mother 195 57 57
total value of production 504 351 698
preferred allocation of time
labor earnings 0 250 501
value of market time 0 120 689
value o f household 
production
409 140 12
value of child care by mother 197 62 62
total value of production 606 232 763
The results in table 7 show that the total value of market and non-market 
production is highest for women who specialize in market work. Using the 
actual hours of work estimates, the total value of production for the woman 
who is in fulltime paid employment is 698 guilders per week. Of course, it 
must be kept in mind that this woman has to buy on the market services such as 
non-parental child care, house cleaning, etc. The total value of production for 
the 'fulltime homemaker' woman is also high as compared with that of the 
woman who has a parttime job. In fact, if this woman (parttime market work) 
has to buy on the market services such as non-parental child care, her total 
welfare is probably the lowest of the three.
In a Dutch study (Bruyn-Flundt, 1985) conducted in the mid-eighties, the 
value of home production was calculated on the basis of women's average gross 
hourly wage rate. The value of household production for a standard household 



























































































month (with calculations being based on the average time spent on housework 
by all women). In our calculations, the value of household production is about 
1,860 guilders a month (net) for women who are in the labor market and have 
children. It is conceivable that the reason why these calculations are somewhat 
lower is that we took account of substitution between market work, housework 
and child care. Besides, our calculations were made for mothers who are in the 
labor market and spend less time doing housework. If we compare our 
calculations for a fulltime homemaker', total value of production is about 
2,268 guilders a month (net), an approximation of the gross monthly sum of 
3,350 guilders mentioned previously. In both studies, therefore, the value of 
household production is substantial.
10 C onclusions and discussion
Women who are in the labor force would prefer to spend more time with their 
children, while women who are full-time homemakers would prefer to have 
part-time jobs averaging 10 hours per week. All women, irrespective of the 
type of household they are in would prefer their partners to spend more time 
caring for the children.
In dual-earner households without children, there is an equality in the 
time allocated by the two partners to market and non-market work: on average, 
these men spend the same amount of time doing housework as their spouses. 
The presence of a child in the household produces an inequality; women then 
spend more time on housework and caring for the children than men, and less 
time in the market.
Both women and men are rationed in their optimal allocation of time, 
especially with regard to non-market work (this is so, at least, if we give 
credence to the views of the female respondents on their partners' preferred 
time allocations).
For the time allocation the wage elasticity of actual labor supply of the woman, 
calculated in the mean value of the actual hours of work, are 1.14. Calculated 
in the preferred hours of work, the wage elasticity for the model is 0.63 and 
0.61 respectively. Considering the allocation of leisure to different types of 
non-market work in the time allocation model does not seem to affect the 
estimates of labor supply elasticities. The theoretical model originally put 
forward by Mincer (1962), in which the value of home production is equal to 
market wage rate + opportunity costs (for example, search and travel costs 
associated with paid employment), has - to our knowledge - never been 



























































































opportunity costs of paid employment in estimating the value of home 
production. Time allocation models provide a framework in which the value of 
household production can be estimated and the division of non-market time 
into different uses like child-rearing, housework, etc. can be analyzed. In this 
respect, time allocation models are to be valued.
The estimates of the demand for 'child quality’ equations show that 
older women experience fewer problems with their children. It is remarkable, 
however, that 80% of the women report having a child with sleeping problems. 
Women who are in the labor market have more obedient children. The 
characteristics of the children all have an insignificant effect on the time spent 
on children in the estimations of the household production model.
We found no results to confirm that the 'male chauvinist model’ 
-husband decides/woman adjusts- holds. Other income in the household has an 
insignificant effect in all three equations estimated in the household production 
model. In the replication study, the labor supply behavior of women is 
independent of male labor supply. For the male partner, market time of both 
partners are complements, while for the female partner the market time of the 
partner is independent. These results seem at variance with (most) other results. 
Reality is more complicated than reflected in the male chauvinist model. If a 
woman's working hours increase, working hours of the father also increase. 
Probably fathers do not prefer to spend their time alone at home caring for the 
children. Mother's time allocation is independent of the father's time allocation. 
This reflects probably her attitude (and his attitude not to be involved) to settle 
child care arrangements by herself (Maassen van den Brink, 1994). However, 
the results could also reflect a liberated' view of Dutch males and an 
autonomous way of life of Dutch women.
The value of household production is substantial and increases still 
further if calculations are based on preferred hours. The total value of 
production of the woman who has fulltime market work is greater than that of 
either the full-time homemaker or the woman in part-time paid employment. 
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For the econometric analysis, we assume that the error terms e, (i -  w, r, z, c) are jointly 
standard normal distributed with correlation coefficients pWJ (j -  r, z, c). This implies that £w - 
Ej are standard normal distributed with mean zero and variance a w2 + o f - 2pwja wOj, where 
a w2 is the variance of the wage equation and of is the variance of the j-th marginal rate of 
substitution equation (j r, z, c).
The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. We used data from the 
stratified sample, we used only of women in paid employment. We therefore correct in our 
likelihood function for this selection bias. For non-participating women the reservation wage 
exceeds the market wage rate at zero hours of work (N -  0).:
(YWP„ - Yfi, + Ew - tg/a, < 0 (23)
If we use only participating women we have to condition on the fact that at zero hours of 
work, the inequality in equation (23) is positive.
The log likelihood function is:
Log L = log[b((£w - 4 )/a r, e j ]  + log[b((ew - ez)/az, e j ]  + log[b((ew - ec)/ac, e j ]  - 
log[4>((YwPw - Yrpr)/V (o..f + o f - 2Pwra wa r))] (24)
where b(.,.) is the bivariate normal density function, <t(.) is the univariate normal distribution 
function, and:
(£» - ty a , = Hj - (Ywp , ,  Y ^^/aj G -  r, z, c)
and (25)
e„ = log W - Ywpw
The bivariate normal distribution function is characterized by:
E((L, - ep/aj)2 -  (ow2 + o f - 2pmowo,)/af
and (26)





























































































Calculation of the total value of production
Using the parameters, it is possible to estimate the value the woman attaches to market work 
(VMW):
VMW -  JN MRsr(t) di -  JN exp(Yt(3r + a rt)dt (21)
= exp(YrP,)(exp(a,N) - l)/a,
It is assumed that the value of market work is zero if the woman does not participate in the 
labor market. We can compare this with the earnings received from doing market work. These 
earnings are calculated by multiplying the hours of market work N with the wage rate W.
In a similar way as the VMW. we can estimate the value of household production (VHP):
VHP -  J  H‘ MV,(t) dt -  J Hz expl Y.Bj + ct,t)dt (23)
= exp(Yt3z)(exp(a7H.) - l) /a .
VHP is the value of the household work measured in the value of the commodities Z.
The value of child care (VCC) is given by:
VCC -  J Hc MRSc(t) dt = </Hc exp(Y B, + a ct)dt (22)
-  exp(Yc|3c)(exp(a£Hc) - l) /a c
The value of child care is expressed in terms of the value of the commodities Z that is 
required by the mother to compensate for a loss in child care time.
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